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The Politics of Incoherence: A Framework for the Analysis of Functional Overlap in International Governance as Two-Level Game

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  • Jungcurt, Stefan
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    Abstract

    Functional overlap in the jurisdiction and competencies of international agreements can lead to incomplete and contradicting regulation, which erodes benefits form international cooperation. The framework developed in this paper seeks to further the theoretical analysis of the domestic and international determinants for the origin and the persistence of such incoherence. Using international regulation on the conservation of plant genetic resources as an illustrative example I address two theoretical challenges – the problem of cross-level inference in theories of international cooperation and the differentiation of processes of substantial bargaining from those of negotiated institutional change. Substantial bargains can be formally analyzed as two-level or nested games with variable payoffs, whereas rigorous analysis of institutional change is limited by too many variations in game structure. I use the framework to derive a typology of games for guiding the systematic analysis of the international, domestic and cross-level interactions that may offer explanations for the phenomenon of incoherence due to functional overlap.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics in its series Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Discussion Papers with number 18841.

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    Date of creation: 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:huiain:18841

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    Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Relations/Trade;

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    1. Helm, Carsten, 2001. "Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL) 33617, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
    2. Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April.
    3. Helm, Carsten, 1998. "International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty - The Case of Transboundary Acidification," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL) 33629, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
    4. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    5. Rosendorff, B.P. & Milner, H., 1995. "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negociations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization," Papers 9511, Southern California - Department of Economics.
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