Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Anreizorientierte Entlohnung In Bezugsgenossenschaften: Eine Theoretische Analyse Einer Leistungsorientierten Entlohnung Zur Maximierung Des Monetären Mitgliedernutzens

Contents:

Author Info

  • Zieseniss, Roland
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Bezugsgenossenschaften weisen durch das Verhältnis zu ihren Eigentümern, welche gleichzeitig Kunden des Unternehmens sind, erhebliche Unterschiede zu anderen Unternehmenstypen auf. Eine Entlohnung der genossenschaftlichen Unternehmensleitung sollte diese Besonderheit berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert verschiedene Vergütungssysteme zur Steuerung der Unternehmensleitung in Genossenschaften. Dabei wird eine neu entwickelte genossenschaftsspezifische Vergütung mit einer Fixentlohnung und einer Entlohnung auf Basis des Genossenschaftsgewinns für eine Bezugsgenossenschaft verglichen.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/137177
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA) in its series 52nd Annual Conference, Stuttgart, Germany, September 26-28, 2012 with number 137177.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ags:gewi12:137177

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Bundesallee 50, 38116 Braunschweig
    Phone: 0531 / 596 5501
    Fax: 0531 / 596 5599
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.gewisola.de/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Genossenschaft; anreizorientierte Entlohnung; Motivation; Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie; Markterfolg; Fördererfolg; cooperatives; incentive-based remuneration; motivation; principal-agent theory; market success; promotion success; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul, 2009. "Incentive Pay for CEOs in Cooperative Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1218-1223.
    2. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    3. Richards, Timothy J. & Klein, Kurt K. & Walburger, Allan M., 1998. "Principal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives: An Empirical Analysis from Rural Alberta," Journal of Cooperatives, NCERA-210, vol. 13.
    4. Kramer, Jost W., 2007. "Erfolgsaspekte genossenschaftlichen Wirtschaftens aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Perspektive," Wismar Discussion Papers 14/2007, Hochschule Wismar, Wismar Business School.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:gewi12:137177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.