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Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax

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  • Ouchida, Yasunori
  • Goto, Daisaku

Abstract

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”

Suggested Citation

  • Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 166524, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:166524
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.166524
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    Cited by:

    1. Moner-Colonques, R. & Rubio, S., 2015. "The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market," Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales, Spanish Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 15(01).
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    3. Moner-Colonques Rafael & Rubio Santiago J., 2016. "The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Environmental Policy: Taxes versus Standards," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 973-1000, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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