Poor rural land property rights as a manifestation of urban bias
AbstractThough poor agricultural land property rights are typical constraints that many peasants in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have faced since independence, little has been done to explain their persistence. I will first discuss the so called evolutionary theory of property right (ETPR), which stipulates that land property rights evolve as an afficient response to the economic environment. The empirical evidence suggests that the policies adopted by African regimes are actually in sharp contrast to what the ETPR predicts. I will then present a simple political economy model with three major assumptions that are commonly observed in SSA countries: (1) de jure political power belongs to the urban elite, (2) urban unrest is a source of threat to the elite and (3) a dual economy with urban and rural sector side by side. Major prediction of the model is that, in such political and economic environment, we observe poor land property rights if there is low level of urbanization and/or large gap between rural and urban wages, which actually are features of many SSA countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland with number 116002.
Date of creation: 02 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Land property rights; Urban bias; Population pressure; Rural-urban migration; Land Economics/Use;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
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