Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel
AbstractBased on an authentic case of contracting for environmental property rights, our paper shows several implications of applying the Coases propositions. The case study adds empirical content to basic transaction costs concepts by analyzing the design and implementation of a contractual arrangement between a pollutee a bottler of mineral water Vittel and several polluting farmers. We analyze the bargaining between land and water rights owners and the bottler Vittel to determine how transaction cost issues (valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly conditions, and third-party effects) were overcome and how they succeeded in contracting for environmental property rights. We provide several comparisons of the Vittel case with other similar cases, leading to generalizations and testable propositions for environmental rights negotiations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark with number 24729.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
case study; contracting; environmental property rights; environmental-related transactions; private arrangement; Vittel; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; K23; Q15; Q25;
Other versions of this item:
- Christophe Depres & Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2008. "Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 412-434, 08.
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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