Landscape Clubs: Co-existence of GM and Organic Crops
AbstractThe possibility of increased production of genetically modified (GM) crops in agriculture accentuates the need to examine the feasibility of GM and non-GM technologies coexisting on a common physical landscape. Using the theory of clubs, this paper examines the possibility of coexistence for GM and organic wheat technologies through the formation of an organic club with an endogenously determined buffer zone. Given the available data on prices, yields, and rotations, it is shown that a club can be created in which GM and organic agricultural production technologies can economically co-exist in the same physical landscape. Specifically, co-existence results in an increase in economic welfare over a situation where only GM technology is used but is not Pareto superior because producers in the buffer zone will incur injury. We show that organic producers in the club can compensate producers in the buffer zone and still be better off. Hence, the compensation principle holds.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark with number 24495.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Crop Production/Industries; D71; Q16;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
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