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The Pitfalls of Transition: Crowding Out the ÂNational Virtues Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Miljkovic, Dragan
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In this paper a view is advanced that explains why the transition to markets did not always lead to the outcomes predicted by the Washington Consensus type strategies. Institutional portfolio theory is used to define a myriad of interests and goals of a transition economy. A model is developed in which external intervention and increased external monitoring are shown to lead to lessening of the intrinsic motivation within transition economies to pursue the reforms as prescribed by Washington Consensus sometimes resulting in very slow growth rates or even a decline of the GDP.
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Paper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 104th Seminar, September 5-8, 2007, Budapest, Hungary with number
8520.
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Date of creation: 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ags:eaa104:8520Contact details of provider: Email: Web page: http://www.eaae.org More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: external monitoring ; institutional change ; intrinsic motivation ; portfolio theory ; Washington consensus ; Institutional and Behavioral Economics ; P21 ; O43 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"The Hidden Costs of Control ,"
American Economic Review ,
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