Adverse Selection In The Market For Crop Insurance

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Adverse Selection In The Market For Crop Insurance

Author Info

Somwaru, Agapi
Makki, Shiva S.
Coble, Keith

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Keith H. Coble

Abstract

This paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insurance policies. We analyze the risk characteristics farmers who bought alternative insurance instruments in 1996-97. Inability to differentiate farmers according to risk types results in pooling equilibrium which may implicitly subsidize high risk farmers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT with number 21002.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea98:21002

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D'Arcy, Stephen P & Doherty, Neil A, 1990. "Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 145-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dionne, G. & Doherty, N.A., 1993. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Papers 9301, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Other versions:
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-35, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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