Export Subsidies And Switching Costs In An Imperfectly Competitive International Wheat Market
AbstractSwitching costs affect importer decisions, hence impacts of subsidies over time. Dynamic, game theoretic simulations of EU-US competition for Moroccan wheat imports suggest firms charge lower prices and governments award higher subsidies with switching costs. Policy under alternative institutional arrangements depends on the extent of switching costs, measured here econometrically.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT with number 20789.
Date of creation: 1998
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Crop Production/Industries; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade;
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