Balancing Act: Economic Incentives, Administrative Restrictions, And Urban Land Expansion In China
AbstractWe examine how the system of “federalism, Chinese style” functions in the context of land allocation. China’s land laws give provision of land a central role in local officials’ growth promotion strategies. Requisitions of farmland by local authorities have engendered significant rural unrest. In response, the central government has attempted to re-establish control over the pace of urban land expansion by enacting regulations limiting conversion of rural land to urban uses. We derive theoretically the conditions under which non-compliance with such regulations is optimal. An econometric investigation shows that legal restrictions on farmland conversion had no effect on rates of farmland loss but did limit urban spatial growth rates in some regions. Our econometric evidence suggests very limited enforcement of those legal limits on farmland conversion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. with number 149669.
Date of creation: 2013
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China; urbanization; land development; farmland conversion; land use; decentralization; fiscal federalism; Community/Rural/Urban Development; International Development; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; R52; R14; Q15; H77;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
- R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2013-06-24 (Development)
- NEP-LAW-2013-06-24 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2013-06-24 (Transition Economics)
- NEP-URE-2013-06-24 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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