Farmers as Producers of Clean Water: Getting Incentive Payments Right and Encouraging Farmer Participation
AbstractThis research involved a field experiment using watershed payments as an incentive for farmers to address agricultural non-point pollution (ANP). Objectives were to: (1) describe how payments were estimated for a field experiment; (2) explain why a team approach is needed for ANP; (3) discuss the essential elements used for recruitment of farmers into a field experiment setting; and (4) address whether or not farmers were motivated to participate and pursue ANP abatement. One year into the experiment, the results are encouraging. About one-half of farmers who attended meetings are participating. They own or operate approximately 41% of the agricultural land in the watershed. Farmer actions to date have included determining an allocation formula for the payment, requesting watershed wide sampling, and cost sharing of ANP abatement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida with number 6342.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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field experiment; team approach; agricultural non-point pollution; performance-based incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2008-11-18 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2008-11-18 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-11-18 (Experimental Economics)
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