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Farmers as Producers of Clean Water: Getting Incentive Payments Right and Encouraging Farmer Participation

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Author Info
Collins, Alan R.
Maille, Peter
Abstract

This research involved a field experiment using watershed payments as an incentive for farmers to address agricultural non-point pollution (ANP). Objectives were to: (1) describe how payments were estimated for a field experiment; (2) explain why a team approach is needed for ANP; (3) discuss the essential elements used for recruitment of farmers into a field experiment setting; and (4) address whether or not farmers were motivated to participate and pursue ANP abatement. One year into the experiment, the results are encouraging. About one-half of farmers who attended meetings are participating. They own or operate approximately 41% of the agricultural land in the watershed. Farmer actions to date have included determining an allocation formula for the payment, requesting watershed wide sampling, and cost sharing of ANP abatement.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida with number 6342.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea08:6342

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Related research
Keywords: field experiment; team approach; agricultural non-point pollution; performance-based incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ribaudo, Marc O. & Horan, Richard D. & Smith, Mark E., 1999. "Economics of Water Quality Protection from Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice," Agricultural Economics Reports 33913, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Katrin Millock & François Salanié, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  6. Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson & Jordan F. Suter & Christian A. Vossler, 2004. "Exploring the Performance of Ambient-Based Policy Instruments When Nonpoint Source Polluters Can Cooperate," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1203-1210, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Segerson, Kathleen & Wu, JunJie, 2006. "Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 165-184, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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