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On Social and Market Sanctions in Deterring non Compliance in Pollution Standards

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  • Bontems, Philippe
  • Rotillon, Gilles

Abstract

In this paper, we theoretically explore the implications of social norms in deterring pollution standard fraud along with economic incentives provided both by markets and regulatory activities. The model assumes that a large number of risk-averse individuals differ not only in their private cost of compliance with the environmental standard but also in their individual aversion to fraud. The aversion of fraud is influenced by the extent of social norms. We show that there may be multiple equilibrium rates of compliance for a given enforcement policy. We also show that under risk aversion the potential loss in market revenues has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium rates of compliance. Similarly, increasing the probability of audit may decrease the equilibrium rate of compliance when stochastic events make unvoluntary non compliance possible. Last, we show that the information brought to the market is crucial for polluters' behavior. For this, we explore the impact of self-reporting procedures and public disclosure of criminal records.

Suggested Citation

  • Bontems, Philippe & Rotillon, Gilles, 2007. "On Social and Market Sanctions in Deterring non Compliance in Pollution Standards," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon 9974, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea07:9974
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9974
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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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