Environmental Regulation, Market Power and Price Discrimination in the Agricultural Chemical Industry
AbstractChemical companies generally support environmental regulatory segregation Canadian and U.S. agricultural chemical markets, apparently because it enables them to practice third order price discrimination. This study provides new cross section evidence that suggests price discrimination is practiced. We examine the potential implications chemical market desegregation for agricultural chemical prices, farmer welfare, and consumer welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19520.
Date of creation: 2005
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price discrimination; agricultural chemicals; economic welfare; Environmental Economics and Policy;
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