Static And Dynamic Efficiency Of Pooled Broiler Contracts: Relative-Performance Contracts Vs. Fixed-Performance Contracts
AbstractWith the broiler industry as a backdrop, this paper develops theoretical models to compare optimal incentives of pooled relative-performance and fixed-performance contracts in static and dynamic models that account for both adverse selection and moral hazard. In spite of some growers' complaints about the relative-performance contracts used in the broiler industry, model results largely justify the popularity and superiority of relative performance contracts relative to fixed performance contracts
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20406.
Date of creation: 2004
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"Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards,"
2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL
21833, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Tomislav Vukina, 2001. "Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1062-1073.
- Armando Levy & Tomislav Vukina, 2002. "Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 205-217, June.
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- Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-79, April.
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