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Common-Property Resource Use And Outside Options: Cooperation Across Generations In A Dynamic Game

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  • Tarui, Nori

Abstract

This paper presents a noncooperative dynamic game with overlapping generations of players using a common-property natural resource, and identifies conditions under which cooperation is supported as an equilibrium of the game. It explores how heterogeneity among the resource users and access to outside markets or microcredit affect local resource use in developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarui, Nori, 2004. "Common-Property Resource Use And Outside Options: Cooperation Across Generations In A Dynamic Game," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20029, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20029
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20029
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    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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