This paper examines the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies, and with herbicide/insecticide oligopolies, given the unique institutional structure and relevant market in agricultural biotechnology. We model the case with homogeneous basic seeds, and investigate both pre-entry and post-entry equilibrium.
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number
19913.
Length: Date of creation: 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:19913
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