Individual transferable quotas system is widely regarded as the best fishery management regime. The literature, however, has ignored the consequence of this managerial system under the existence of market imperfection. This article analyzes the behavior of fishing households based on the household model when individual transferable quota system is introduced under missing labor market. It is shown that the individual transferable quotas system could adversely redistribute the quotas through quotas trade and thus cause social inefficiency.
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada with number
22243.
Length: Date of creation: 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea03:22243
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