Cash Market Or Contract? How Technology And Consumer Demand Influence The Decision
AbstractThe use of contracts for producing and marketing agricultural commodities has become nearly universal in some sectors. Two factors are most frequently cited as being responsible for the use of agricultural contracts. The first, a demand-side factor, is the development of strong consumer preferences for specific qualities. The second, a supply-side factor, is technological change. In this paper, we use a principal agent framework to model how consumer demand and technology enter into a firm's decision to use contracts or the cash market.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL with number 20723.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brent Hueth & Ethan Ligon, 1999.
"Producer Price Risk and Quality Measurement,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(3), pages 512-524.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, M E, 1975. "A Price Characterization of Efficient Random Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-92, March.
- Timothy J. Richards & Paul M. Patterson & Ram N. Acharya, 2001. "Price Behavior in a Dynamic Oligopsony: Washington Processing Potatoes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(2), pages 259-271.
- Azzam, Azzeddine M. & Schroeter, John R., 1997.
"Concentration in Beef Packing: Do Gains Outweigh Losses?,"
Staff General Research Papers
5093, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Azzam, Azzeddine M. & Schroeter, John R., 1997. "Concentration in Beef Packing: Do Gains Outweigh Losses?," Choices, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 12(1).
- Knoeber, Charles R, 1989. "A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 271-92, Fall.
- Perry, Janet E. & Banker, David E. & Green, Robert C., 1999. "Broiler Farms' Organization, Management, and Performance," Agricultural Information Bulletins 33739, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-79, April.
- Martinez, Stephen W., 1999. "Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries: Implications for Pork and Chicken Products," Agricultural Economics Reports 34031, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Hennessy, David A. & Lawrence, John D., 1999. "Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality in the Hog Sector," Staff General Research Papers 1706, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.