Strategic voting in proportional representation systems
AbstractWe propose a model of voter decision-making in proportional representation systems: ultra-rational strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions and vote to maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Enterprise Institute in its series Working Papers with number 40362.
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
voting; proportional representation;
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- A - General Economics and Teaching
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-04-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2014-04-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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