Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism
AbstractWe characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with the two fundamental axioms of fairness: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. We consider cases where agents have equal rights over external world resources but are individually responsible for their preferences/costs. Our characterization answers the political philosophy question of what kind of welfare differentials allowed if we respect private ownership rights over self and public ownership over external world. We also relate no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence to "equality of what" debate and build a link between resource and opportunity egalitarianism, and welfare-egalitarianism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2011-19.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
egalitarianism; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; equality of opportunity; resource egalitarianism; private ownership of the self and public ownership of external world; NIMBY problems; allocation of indivisible goods and money; discrete public goods; strategy-proofness.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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