We present a simple model of corporate tax evasion allowing for potentially bad governments that abuse their fiscal powers to extort monies from firms. Our model shows that the potential existence of extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax evasion and increases enforcement costs.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2006-08.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Hindriks, J. & Keen, M. & Muthoo, A., 1996.
"Corruption, Extortion and Evasion,"
Papers
179, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
Other versions:
Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.