Corporate Tax Evasion and Extortionist Governments
AbstractWe present a simple model of corporate tax evasion allowing for potentially bad governments that abuse their fiscal powers to extort monies from firms. Our model shows that the potential existence of extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax evasion and increases enforcement costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2006-08.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
tax evasion; extortion; corporate taxation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2006-05-13 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-05-13 (Regulation)
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