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Author Info

  • Sophie Bade

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Penn State University)

  • Guillaume Haeringer

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

  • Ludovic Renou

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We then show that the sufficient conditions for Theorem to hold are tight.

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File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2005-01.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2005-01.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2005-01

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Keywords: strategic-form games; strategy spaces; Nash equilibrium; two players;

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References

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  1. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  2. Andrew McLennan, 2005. "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 141-174, 01.
  3. McLennan, Andrew & Berg, Johannes, 2005. "Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 264-295, May.
  4. McKelvey, Richard D. & McLennan, Andrew, 1996. "Computation of equilibria in finite games," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: H. M. Amman & D. A. Kendrick & J. Rust (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 87-142 Elsevier.
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1787, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Von Stengel, Bernhard, 2002. "Computing equilibria for two-person games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 1723-1759 Elsevier.
  7. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 1994. "On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1089, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Hans M. Amman & David A. Kendrick, . "Computational Economics," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number comp1, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Guillaume Haeringer & Sophie Bade & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," Working Papers 2006.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2005. "The Making of International Environmental Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 652.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.
  4. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  5. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.

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