Why the Weak Win: The Strategic Role of Investment in Lobbying
AbstractRecent empirical work suggests that old er and less efficient industries are typically more successful at securing trade protection and income support. Similarly, environmentally damaging industries often lobby effectively for less stringent environmental regulations. This paper explains the lobbying success of these industries in terms of strategic role of investment as a credible commitment device.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 1998-09.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, July 2001, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp. 1-22 as "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying"
trade policy; interst groups; investments; industry;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anderson, Kym, 1995.
"Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-23, January.
- Anderson, Kym, 1993. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
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