Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse
AbstractA puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the Â‘resource curse.Â’ These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path. We test our predictions by adding measures of democracy and authoritarianism to existing regression models of the resource curse, and obtain support for our hypotheses.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Adelaide, Centre for International Economic Studies in its series Centre for International Economic Studies Working Papers with number 2003-20.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Resource endowment and economic growth; development; rent seeking; bribing; corruption.;
Other versions of this item:
- Bulte Erwin & Damania Richard, 2008. "Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-30, February.
- Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Minier, Jenny A, 1998. " Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 241-66, September.
- Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar, 2005.
"Optimal Dutch disease,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 494-515, December.
- Al-Ubaydli, Omar, 2012. "Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 137-152.
- James, Alex & Aadland, David, 2011. "The curse of natural resources: An empirical investigation of U.S. counties," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 440-453, May.
- Goel, Rajeev K. & Korhonen, Iikka, 2009.
"Composition of Exports and Cross-Country Corruption,"
BOFIT Discussion Papers
5/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Goel, Rajeev K. & Korhonen, Iikka, 2011. "Exports and cross-national corruption: A disaggregated examination," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 109-124, March.
- Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2010.
"Financial Integration in Autocracies: Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal?,"
FIW Working Paper series
- Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2013. "Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2010. "Financial Integration in Autocracies: Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201014, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Sambit Bhattacharyya & Roland Hodler, 2008.
"Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption,"
OxCarre Working Papers
020, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Carmignani, Fabrizio & Avom, Desire, 2010. "The social development effects of primary commodity export dependence," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 317-330, December.
- Gregmar Galinato & Suzette Galinato, 2010. "The Effects of Corruption Control and Political Stability on the Environmental Kuznets Curve of Deforestation-Induced Carbon Dioxide Emissions," Working Papers 2010-9, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Blanco, Luisa & Grier, Robin, 2012. "Natural resource dependence and the accumulation of physical and human capital in Latin America," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 281-295.
- Galinato, Gregmar I. & Galinato, Suzette P., 2013. "The short-run and long-run effects of corruption control and political stability on forest cover," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 153-161.
- Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2008.
"Constitutions and the resource curse,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 227-246, October.
- Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne & Williams, Aled, 2009. "Mission improbable: Does petroleum-related aid address the resource curse?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 954-965, March.
- Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitriy Kvasov).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.