Capabilities, Confusion, and the Costs of Coordination On Some Problems in Recent Research On Inter-Firm Relations
AbstractThe arguably dominant approaches to the study of interfirm relations are the capabilities and organizational economics perspectives. This paper discusses their merits and weaknesses, concentrating on the capabilities perspective, which is argued to rest on rather weak foundations, particularly as a theory of economic organization (including interfirm relations). However, it is suggested that both perspectives may be seen as part of an overarching bargaining approach to economic organization (yet to be developed). Both perspectives have identified impediments to efficient bargaining.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number 99-7.
Date of creation: 1999
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Web page: http://www.druid.dk/
Interfirm relations; capabilities; organizational economics; research methodology;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
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