Austrian Economics and Game Theory a Preliminary Methodological Stocktaking
AbstractThis paper discusses, from the perspective of Austrian economics, the merits and drawbacks of game theory in economics. It begins by arguing that Austrians have neglected game theory at their peril, and then argues that game theoretic reasoning may be one way of modelling key Austrian insights, although some aspects of game theory doesn’t square easily with Austrian economics. However, a major stumbling block for an Austrian acceptance of game theory may lie in the traditional Austrian resistance to formal methods.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number 98-28.
Date of creation: 1998
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Austrian economics; game theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
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