The Global Externality Game Ii: Its Ct Solution

The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageThe CT solution: A computable strategy and imputation in the γ-core of the GEGThe linear caseA nonlinear caseIdentical playersEnvironmental and general economic characteristicsThe γ-core and the optimal level of pollutionThe γ-core and economic theoryExternalities vs. public goodsWhich optimum among the many?An amendment to the Coase theorem in the case of international externalitiesSpecific properties of the CT solutionExhibiting the transfers implicit in the solutionThe CT transfers formulaThe economic significanceHow is the ecological surplus being shared at the CT solution?The respective positions of polluters vs. pollutees at the CT solution: Graphical illustrationThe game with 1 polluter and 2 polluteesThe game with 2 polluters and 1 polluteeDo polluters pay at the CT solution?The CT solution and the benefit principle of public financeOn free riding and γ-core stabilityFree riding vs. blockingThe γ-assumption and coalition formationPreference revelation free riding and the CT solutionWhither the γ-core solution for the GEG?On the nature of the game: A negociation on a diffuse externalityThe γ-partitionThe γ-strategies of the non-membersThe PCNE and the γ-coalitional functionThe γ-core is self-enforcing