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Lobbying Mechanisms

In: State, Institutions and Democracy

Author

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  • Martin Gregor

    (Charles University)

Abstract

Political influence of special interests is a rich phenomenon, challenging for both theory and empirics. One of the key questions is whether the influence is through the provision of money, information, or both. In the first generation of empirical studies, the monetary channel is examined by looking upon the effect of campaign contributions through Political Action Committees on roll call voting. The results of the roll call voting studies conducted in the United States since 1970s are nevertheless inconclusive. Even descriptive evidence suggests that campaign contributions through Political Action Committees are not as important as direct individual contributions (Ansolabehere et al. 2003).

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Gregor, 2017. "Lobbying Mechanisms," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), State, Institutions and Democracy, pages 17-52, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-44582-3_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_2
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    Cited by:

    1. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.

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