This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard

In: Capital Flows and the International Financial System

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Michael Mussa (International Monetary Fund)
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/1999/Mussa.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
This chapter was published in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.) Capital Flows and the International Financial System, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages , 1999.

This item is provided by Reserve Bank of Australia in its series RBA Annual Conference Volume with number acv1999-17.

Handle: RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv1999-17

Contact details of provider:
Postal: GPO Box 3947, Sydney NSW 2001
Phone: 61-2-9551-8111
Fax: 61-2-9551-8000
Email:
Web page: http://www.rba.gov.au/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.rba.gov.au/OrderForm/index.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paula Drew).

Related research
Keywords: moral hazard in Asian crisis economies; international financial architecture;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," IMF Working Papers 04/148, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peter B. Clark & Haizhou Huang, 2001. "International Financial Contagion and the Fund: A Theoretical Framework," IMF Working Papers 01/137, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 2(14), pages 1-41. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jun Il Kim, 2007. "Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 07/104, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2004. "The Mussa Theorem: and Other Results on IMF Induced Moral Hazard," IMF Working Papers 04/192, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Priyadarshani Joshi & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973-2003," IMF Working Papers 05/8, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.