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Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal: Orange Marketing Orders

In: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy

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  • Elizabeth Hoffman
  • Gary D. Libecap

Abstract

Yet, in our generation we have seen scarcity vanquished, and our ever present fear, so far as agriculture is concerned, is a fear of over abundance. We wish, if not for scarcity, at least for relief from price depressing surpluses. Rexford G. Tugwell, assistant secretary of agriculture.
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Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth Hoffman & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal: Orange Marketing Orders," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 189-222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6576
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Berck & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 1985. "A Dynamic Analysis of Marketing Orders, Voting, and Welfare," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 67(3), pages 487-496.
    2. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    3. Shepard, Lawrence, 1986. "Cartelization of the California-Arizona Orange Industry, 1934-1981," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 83-123, April.
    4. Jamison, John A., 1971. "Marketing Orders and Public Policy for the Fruit and Vegetable Industries," Food Research Institute Studies, Stanford University, Food Research Institute, vol. 10(3), pages 180-180.
    5. Rucker, Randal R & Thurman, Walter N, 1990. "The Economic Effects of Supply Controls: The Simple Analytics of the U.S. Peanut Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 483-515, October.
    6. Gary D. Thompson & Charles C. Lyon, 1989. "Marketing Order Impacts on Farm-Retail Price Spreads: The Suspension of Prorates on California-Arizona Navel Oranges," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(3), pages 647-660.
    7. Rucker, Randal R & Alston, Lee J, 1987. "Farm Failures and Government Intervention: A Case Study of the 1930' s," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 724-730, September.
    8. Powers, Nicholas J., 1990. "Federal Marketing Orders for Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts, and Specialty Crops," Agricultural Economic Reports 308137, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    9. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    10. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1987. "Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
    11. H. E. Erdman, 1934. "The California Agricultural Prorate ACT," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 16(4), pages 624-636.
    12. Glenn Nelson & Tom H. Robinson, 1978. "Retail and Wholesale Demand and Marketing Order Policy for Fresh Navel Oranges," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 60(3), pages 502-509.
    13. Hoy F. Carman & Daniel H. Pick, 1988. "Marketing California-Arizona lemons without marketing order shipment controls," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(3), pages 245-259.
    14. Libecap, Gary D., 1989. "The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933–1972," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 833-855, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary D. Libecap, 1998. "The Great Depression and the Regulating State: Federal Government Regulation of Agriculture, 1884-1970," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 181-224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Alexander, Barbara & Libecap, Gary D., 2000. "The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 370-400, October.
    3. Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "7. The Conditions for Successful Collective Action," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 563-592, October.
    4. Atack, Jeremy & Coclanis, Peter & Grantham, George, 2009. "Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Development--An appreciation and research agenda," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 160-167, January.
    5. Leathers, Howard D., 2007. "Orderly Marketing in Agriculture Revisited," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 1-12, October.

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