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Retirement, Early Retirement and Disability: Explaining Labor Force Participation after 55 in France

In: Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement

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  • Luc Behaghel
  • Didier Blanchet
  • Muriel Roger

Abstract

We analyze the influence of health and financial incentives on the retirement behavior of older workers in France, building upon Stock and Wise (1990) option value approach. The model accounts for three main retirement routes: the normal retirement, disability insurance (DI) and unemployment/preretirement pathways, and is estimated with a combination of microeconomic datasets that include the French data of the European SHARE survey. The estimates confirm that a decrease in the generosity of the pension and DI schemes induces people to stay longer in the labor market, and that people with better health tend to retire later. We present extreme situations simulating what individual's retirement behavior would have been if only one retirement route had existed and in the absence of constraints on work capabilities. We show that average years of work between 55 and 64 are nearly 14% greater when regular retirement incentives are applied to the whole population than when it is DI rules that are systematically applied.

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This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 13327.

Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:13327

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  1. James M. Poterba & Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, 2010. "The Asset Cost of Poor health," NBER Working Papers 16389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Luc Behaghel & Didier Blanchet & Thierry Debrand & Muriel Roger, 2011. "Disability and Social Security Reforms:The French Case," Working Papers, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics DT38, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Feb 2011.
    • Luc Behaghel & Didier Blanchet & Thierry Debrand & Muriel Roger, 2012. "Disability and Social Security Reforms: The French Case," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Historical Trends in Mortality and Health, Employment, and Disability Insurance Participatio, pages 301-326 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. David A. Wise, 1990. "Issues in the Economics of Aging," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number wise90-1.
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