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On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?

In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25

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  • Rong Qian
  • Carmen M. Reinhart
  • Kenneth S. Rogoff

Abstract

This paper uses a data set of over two hundred years of sovereign debt, banking and inflation crises to explore the question of how long it takes a country to “graduate†from the typical pattern of serial crisis that most emerging markets experience. We find that for default and inflation crises, twenty years is a significant market, but the distribution of recidivism has extremely fat tails. In the case of banking crises, it is unclear whether countries ever graduate. We also examine the more recent phenomenon of IMF programs, which sometimes result in “near misses†but sometimes end in default even after a program is instituted. The paper raises the important theoretical question of why countries experience serial default, and how they might graduate.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Daron Acemoglu & Michael Woodford, 2011. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number acem10-1, May.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 12024.

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    1. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2007. "Do Countries Default in "Bad Times" ?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 352-360, 04-05.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
    3. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2004. "The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A reinterpretation," MPRA Paper 14070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Carmen M. Reinhart, 2010. "This Time is Different Chartbook: Country Histories on Debt, Default, and Financial Crises," NBER Working Papers 15815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Alessandro Missale & Olivier Jean Blanchard, 1991. "The Debt Burden and Debt Maturity," NBER Working Papers 3944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    7. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Gita Gopinath, 2007. "Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang," NBER Working Papers 13353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3575, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    19. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, December.
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    22. Luis A. V. Catao & Ana Fostel & Sandeep Kapur, 2008. "Persistent Gaps and Default Traps," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0803, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Schaltegger, Christoph & Weder, Martin, 2013. "Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of Sovereign Default," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79979, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Reinhart, Carmen & Qian, Rong & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2010. "Do countries “graduate” from crises? Some historical perspective," MPRA Paper 24761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Qian, Rong, 2012. "Why do some countries default more often than others ? the role of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5993, The World Bank.
    4. Amalia Morales-Zumaquero & Simón Sosvilla-Rivero, 2012. "Real exchange rate volatility, financial crises and nominal exchange regimes," Working Papers 12-05, Asociación Española de Economía y Finanzas Internacionales.
    5. Pope, Robin & Selten, Reinhard, 2013. "Currency wars not public debt may create a financial meltdown," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79862, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Richard J. Herring, 2013. "The Case for Rapid Resolution Plans," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 3, pages 1-17, May.
    7. Taylor, Alan M, 2010. "Global finance after the crisis," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 50(4), pages 366-377.
    8. Raffaela Giordano & Marcello Pericoli & Pietro Tommasino, 2013. "Pure or wake-up-call contagion? Another look at the EMU sovereign debt crisis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 904, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Vulentin, Guillermo & Vegh, Carlos A & Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2012. "On Graduation from Fiscal Procyclicality," Scholarly Articles 8694931, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Mark Aguiar, 2011. "Comment on "On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crises: Elusive or Illusion?"," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25, pages 37-46 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Tjeerd M. Boonman & Jan P. A. M. Jacobs & Gerard H. Kuper, 2011. "Why didn't the Global Financial Crisis hit Latin America?," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-63, CIRANO.
    12. Kay Giesecke & Francis A. Longstaff & Stephen Schaefer & Ilya Strebulaev, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Corporate Default Crises: A Long-Term Perspective," NBER Working Papers 17854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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