The Relevance of Confederate Structures in the Judicial Architecture of the Draft EU Constitution
In: Conferences on New Political Economy
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- George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
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