Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - A Stocktaking Exercise

Contents:

Author Info

  • Marc Quintyn

Abstract

The attention for the governance of financial sector supervisors is of a recent date. The debate has risen to the fore as part of the wider discussion about the appropriate institutional organization of financial supervision and the drive for compliance with international best practices in the regulatory field. This paper takes stock of the regulatory governance debate. We first discuss the main premise of the paper, that regulatory governance plays a pivotal role in instilling financial sector governance, which in turn is a key source of corporate governance in the nonfinancial sector (the governance nexus). Having established this premise, we identify the main pillars for regulatory governance-independence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. The next two sections take a look at where we stand in practice. First, we review to what extent recent reforms of supervisory structures worldwide are embracing the four pillars underlying regulatory governance. We find that policy makers are gradually making efforts to improve the foundations for regulatory governance. However, further convincing, in particular of the beneficial effects of accountability, seems necessary. Secondly, we review a number of studies that assess the impact of (aspects of) regulatory governance on the soundness of the banking system (an indicator of good financial system corporate governance), or other aspects of the governance nexus. Most studies show a positive impact of stronger regulatory governance frameworks on the soundness of the financial system. However, further empirical evidence to strengthen the case for good regulatory governance seems desirable.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study20074.pdf
File Function: Main Text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

as in new window

This chapter was published in:

  • Marc Quintyn, 2007. "Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - a Stocktaking Exercise," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2007/4 edited by Morten Balling.
    This item is provided by SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum in its series Chapters in SUERF Studies with number 47-1.

    Handle: RePEc:erf:erfssc:47-1

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: SUERF c/o OeNB, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Phone: +43/1/404 20 7216
    Fax: +43/1/404 20 7298
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.suerf.org
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Postal: SUERF c/o OeNB, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Email:

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Other versions of this item:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Richard Podpiera, 2004. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Working Papers 04/204, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn & Silvia Ramirez, 2007. "The Fear of Freedom," IMF Working Papers 07/25, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Nieto, Maria J. & Quintyn, Marc, 2011. "Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 204-214, December.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.
    3. Marc Quintyn & Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis," IMF Working Papers 11/261, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    5. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
    6. repec:onb:oenbwp:y:2010:i:1:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc, 2008. "Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 153-173, August.
    8. Marc Quintyn & Donato Masciandaro & María Nieto, 2009. "Will they Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 09/142, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    10. Sándor Gardó, 2010. "Bank Governance and Financial Stability in CESEE: A Review of the Literature," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erf:erfssc:47-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Bailey).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.