Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU: Do Structural Reforms Matter?
Abstract
This paper studies the incentives to join or enlarge a monetary union under alternative assumptions about the extent of market reform within the union and in candidate countries. Lack of labour mobility, wage/price flexibility or fiscal reform brings costs for both new entrants and in the existing union. Countries will only want to join a union where there has been sufficient reform, and where markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their new partners as well. Fiscal restrictions, or a lack of fiscal flexibility, will exaggerate this incentive mismatch and may delay the necessary reforms.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Handle: RePEc:erf:erfssc:30-1
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Svend E Hougaard Jensen & Christian Richter, 2004. "Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU: Do Structural Reforms Matter?," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2004/3 edited by Morten Balling, 03.
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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