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Conclusions: Public–Private Partnerships – International Experiences and Future Challenges

In: International Handbook on Public–Private Partnerships

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  • Graeme A. Hodge
  • Carsten Greve
  • Anthony E. Boardman

Abstract

In this timely Handbook, leading scholars from around the world explore the challenges presented by infrastructure PPPs, and contemplate what lies ahead as governments balance the need to provide innovative new infrastructure against the requirement for good public governance. This Handbook builds on a range of exciting theoretical lenses that span several disciplinary boundaries. It presents innovative insights and informed perspectives from an international base of empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Graeme A. Hodge & Carsten Greve & Anthony E. Boardman, 2010. "Conclusions: Public–Private Partnerships – International Experiences and Future Challenges," Chapters, in: Graeme A. Hodge & Carsten Greve & Anthony E. Boardman (ed.), International Handbook on Public–Private Partnerships, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13451_26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    2. Roberts, Alasdair, 2010. "The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture of Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195374988.
    3. M. Minogue, 2002. "Governance–Based Analysis Of Regulation," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 649-666, December.
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