Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
AbstractThis chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.
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strategyproofness; social choice; dominant strategies; domain restrictions; voting;
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