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Chapter Eighteen - Topological Theories of Social Choice
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented.
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This chapter was published in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2011.
"Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
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