Values of perfectly competitive economies
In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
AbstractPerfectly competitive economies are economic models with many agents, each of whom is relatively insignificant. This chapter studies the relations between the basic economic concept of competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium, and the game-theoretic solution concept of value. It includes the classical Value Equivalence Theorem together with its many extensions and generalizations, as well as recent results.
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