This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Economic history and game theory

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Greif, Avner

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that uses game theory for economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of applying game theory to economic history and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an application. Most of the essay, however, is devoted to studies in economic history that use game theory as their main analytical framework. Studies are presented in a way that highlights the range of potential topics in economic history that can be and have been enriched by a game-theoretical analysis.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7P5P-4FD79WM-H/2/6d54ae7f4ebd650fec099f63c6e02d81
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 52, pages 1989-2024, 2002.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 3-52.

Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-52

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Contract Incompleteness, Contractual Enforcement and Bureaucracies," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s16, Economics Department, Princeton University.
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.