On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences
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- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, .
"Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment,"
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- Vital Anderhub & Simon GÃ¤chter & Manfred KÃ¶nigstein, 2002. "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
- Anderhub, Vital & Gächter, Simon & Königstein, Manfred, 1999. "Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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