IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/psh908.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Ran I. Shorrer

Personal Details

First Name:Ran
Middle Name:I.
Last Name:Shorrer
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psh908
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://rshorrer.weebly.com/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Pennsylvania State University

State College, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://econ.la.psu.edu/
RePEc:edi:depsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer, 2023. "Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review," NBER Working Papers 30973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2016. ""Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-Proof Environment," Working Paper 413411, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  4. Ran I. Shorrer, 2015. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors: The Prior-FreeImplications," Working Paper 258061, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  5. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2015. "Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game," Working Paper 240431, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  6. Peter Coles & Yannai Gonczarowski & Ran Shorrer, 2014. "Strategic Behavior in Unbalanced Matching Markets," Working Paper 206481, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  7. Peter Coles & Ran Shorrer, 2013. "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Ran I. Shorrer, 2012. "Solution to exchanges 10.2 puzzle: borrowing in the limit as our nerdiness goes to infinity," Working Paper 89391, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  9. Ran Shorrer, "undated". "Consistent Indices," Working Paper 213491, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  10. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master?s Match," Working Paper 501371, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  11. Ran I. Shorrer & Eshchar A. Ben-Shitrit, "undated". "Old Paradigms and New Realities: Remnants of Past Regulatory Policy and the Present Crisis in Israel's Financial Markets," Working Paper 89396, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  12. Peter A. Coles & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," Working Paper 89381, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  13. Avinatan Hassidim & Deborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "The Mechanism is Truthful, Why aren?t You?," Working Paper 501161, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  14. Alvin E. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel," Working Paper 242036, Harvard University OpenScholar.

Articles

  1. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 205-209, May.
  2. Avinatan Hassidim & Déborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 220-224, May.
  3. Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014. "Optimal truncation in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.
  4. Coles Peter A. & Shorrer Ran, 2012. "Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-25, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer, 2023. "Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review," NBER Working Papers 30973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Emil Chrisander & Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, 2023. "Why Do Students Lie and Should We Worry? An Analysis of Non-truthful Reporting," Papers 2302.13718, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    2. Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen & Lykke Sterll Christensen & Mikkel H{o}st Gandil & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, 2023. "Playing the system: address manipulation and access to schools," Papers 2305.18949, arXiv.org.
    3. Simon Gleyze & Philippe Jehiel, 2023. "Expectation Formation, Local Sampling and Belief Traps: A new Perspective on Education Choices," Working Papers halshs-04154324, HAL.
    4. Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas & Christensen, Lykke Sterll & Gandil, Mikkel & Sievertsen, Hans Henrik, 2023. "Playing the System: Address Manipulation and Access to Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 16197, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

  2. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1791-1848.
    2. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Reversing Reserves," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 995, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ori Heffetz & Matthew Rabin, 2019. "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 26394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Pauline Vorjohann, 2023. "Reference-dependent choice bracketing," Discussion Papers 2309, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    5. Koutout, Kristine & Dustan, Andrew & Van der Linden, Martin & Wooders, Myrna, 2021. "Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    6. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
    7. Christopher Neilson & Felipe Arteaga & Adam Kapor & Seth Zimmerman, 2021. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School ChoiceSmart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," Working Papers 650, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    8. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ofer Glicksohn & Ori Heffetz & Assaf Romm, 2022. "Deferred Acceptance with News Utility," NBER Working Papers 30635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    10. Klümper, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2020. "Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    11. Mu Zhang, 2021. "A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk," Papers 2102.07286, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    12. Niederle, Muriel & Vespa, Emanuel, 2023. "Cognitive Limitations: Failures of Contingent Thinking," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5q14p1np, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

  3. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2016. ""Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-Proof Environment," Working Paper 413411, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2017. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," NBER Working Papers 23771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    3. Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz, 2019. "Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance," Working Papers 1119, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Working Papers 1913, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    5. André Schmelzer, 2018. "Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 17-50, December.
    6. Emil Chrisander & Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, 2023. "Why Do Students Lie and Should We Worry? An Analysis of Non-truthful Reporting," Papers 2302.13718, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    7. Julien Grenet & YingHua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1427-1476.
    8. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018. "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 156-183.
    9. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
    10. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021. "Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2021-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    11. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    12. Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2022. "Fair cake-cutting in practice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 28-49.
    13. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    14. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020. "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.
    15. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ori Heffetz & Matthew Rabin, 2019. "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 26394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness Around the Clock," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 151, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    17. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
    18. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2022. "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 2022-24, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    19. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo J. Somaini, 2019. "Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models," NBER Working Papers 26568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Alex Rees-Jones & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2017. "Taxing Humans: Pitfalls of the Mechanism Design Approach and Potential Resolutions," NBER Working Papers 23980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
    22. Avinatan Hassidim & Déborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 220-224, May.
    23. Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications From Early Offers in University Admissions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 158, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    24. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Experiments on matching markets: A survey," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    25. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
    26. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    27. Koutout, Kristine & Dustan, Andrew & Van der Linden, Martin & Wooders, Myrna, 2021. "Mechanism performance under strategy advice and sub-optimal play: A school choice experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    28. Pablo Guillen & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2017. "Not quite the best response: truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 670-686, September.
    29. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
    30. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.
    31. Hayri A. Arslan, 2021. "Preference estimation in centralized college admissions from reported lists," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(5), pages 2865-2911, November.
    32. Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur & Kiefer, Alexander & Melatos, Mark, 2020. "A Field Evaluation of a Matching Mechanism: University Applicant Behaviour in Australia," Working Papers 2020-15, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    33. Chen, Yan & Kesten, Onur, 2019. "Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 83-100.
    34. Maria Kyropoulou & Josu'e Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice," Papers 1810.08243, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    35. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    36. Hassidim, Avinatan & Romm, Assaf & Shorrer, Ran I., 2019. "Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 40-42.
    37. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    38. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2016. "Can Market Participants Report their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," NBER Working Papers 22448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    39. He, Yinghua & Magnac, Thierry, 2018. "A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 11967, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    40. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.

  4. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2015. "Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game," Working Paper 240431, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.

  5. Peter Coles & Yannai Gonczarowski & Ran Shorrer, 2014. "Strategic Behavior in Unbalanced Matching Markets," Working Paper 206481, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014. "Optimal truncation in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.

  6. Peter Coles & Ran Shorrer, 2013. "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 632, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2014. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 232-251.
    3. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Papers 2107.04098, arXiv.org.
    4. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Pan, Siqi, 2021. "Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 280, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Marco Castillo & Ahrash Dianat, 2021. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1365-1389, December.
    6. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Amin Saberi & Clayton Thomas & Geng Zhao, 2020. "Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity," Papers 2009.05124, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    7. Janine Balter & Michela Rancan & Olena Senyuta, 2014. "Truncation in the Matching Markets and Market Ineffciency," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/04, European University Institute.
    8. Castillo, Marco & Dianat, Ahrash, 2016. "Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 180-196.
    9. Martin Van der Linden, 2019. "Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 609-645, June.
    10. Christian Haas & Margeret Hall, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching for mentor-mentee allocations—Algorithms and manipulation strategies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(3), pages 1-27, March.
    11. Vincent Meisner, 2023. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2733-2745, May.
    12. Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
    13. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
    14. Christian Haas, 2021. "Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 1115-1148, April.
    15. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3694-3713, June.
    16. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Yash Kanoria & Peng Shi, 2020. "Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2163-2193, May.

  7. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master?s Match," Working Paper 501371, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Ma & Scott Duke Kominers, 2018. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 19-011, Harvard Business School.
    2. Yash Kanoria & Seungki Min & Pengyu Qian, 2020. "The Competition for Partners in Matching Markets," Papers 2006.14653, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    3. Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    4. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    5. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020. "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 41-53.
    7. Meisner, Vincent, 2021. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 289, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
    9. Hai Nguyen & Thành Nguyen & Alexander Teytelboym, 2021. "Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7438-7454, December.
    10. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1035, Boston College Department of Economics.
    11. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Lior Kovalio & Noam Nisan & Assaf Romm, 2019. "Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements," Papers 1905.00364, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    12. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 208, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    13. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    14. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2021. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process," Papers 2106.06582, arXiv.org.

  8. Peter A. Coles & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," Working Paper 89381, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Kris De Jaegher, 2015. "Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 233-251, November.

  9. Avinatan Hassidim & Deborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "The Mechanism is Truthful, Why aren?t You?," Working Paper 501161, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Yash Kanoria & Seungki Min & Pengyu Qian, 2020. "The Competition for Partners in Matching Markets," Papers 2006.14653, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    3. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Working Papers 1913, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    4. André Schmelzer, 2018. "Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 3(1), pages 17-50, December.
    5. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    6. Crosetto, Paolo & Filippin, Antonio & Katuščák, Peter & Smith, John, 2020. "Central tendency bias in belief elicitation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    7. Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe J. Tergiman, 2020. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," NBER Working Papers 26734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2022. "Fair cake-cutting in practice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 28-49.
    9. Federico Echenique & Ruy Gonzalez & Alistair Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2020. "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," Papers 2002.05323, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    10. Surender Baswana & Partha Pratim Chakrabarti & Sharat Chandran & Yashodhan Kanoria & Utkarsh Patange, 2019. "Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 338-354, September.
    11. In'acio B'o & Li Chen & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2023. "Strategic Responses to Personalized Pricing and Demand for Privacy: An Experiment," Papers 2304.11415, arXiv.org.
    12. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
    13. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
    14. Meisner, Vincent, 2021. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 289, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    15. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 951-963, February.
    16. Marco Castillo & Ahrash Dianat, 2021. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1365-1389, December.
    17. Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2019. "A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1048r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Nov 2019.
    18. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 208, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    19. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
    20. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    21. Pinaki Mandal & Souvik Roy, 2022. "Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 261-290, February.
    22. Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Nayga, Rodolfo M., 2022. "Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities, and cognitive load," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 49-65.
    23. Maria Kyropoulou & Josu'e Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2018. "Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice," Papers 1810.08243, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    24. Yu, Hao & Huang, Min & Chao, Xiuli & Yue, Xiaohang, 2022. "Truthful multi-attribute multi-unit double auctions for B2B e-commerce logistics service transactions," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    25. Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    26. Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Level-k reasoning in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 1-17.
    27. Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "School Choice with Consent: An Experiment," Working Papers 2021-09, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Feb 2022.
    28. Martin, Daniel & Muñoz-Rodriguez, Edwin, 2022. "Cognitive costs and misperceived incentives: Evidence from the BDM mechanism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    29. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
    30. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    31. Camilo J. Sirguiado & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2024. "Strategic Behavior Without Outside Options," Working Papers wp553, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

  10. Alvin E. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel," Working Paper 242036, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Gudmundsson, Jens, 2015. "Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Matching," Working Papers 2015:32, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2017.

Articles

  1. Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 205-209, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Avinatan Hassidim & Déborah Marciano & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 220-224, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014. "Optimal truncation in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Coles Peter A. & Shorrer Ran, 2012. "Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-25, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2013-06-16 2014-11-01 2014-11-07 2014-11-07 2017-01-29. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2013-06-16 2014-11-01 2014-11-07 2014-11-07 2015-03-22. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2013-06-16 2014-11-01
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2020-03-09 2023-03-27
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2017-01-29 2020-03-09
  6. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2014-11-07
  7. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2013-06-16
  8. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2023-03-27
  9. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2015-04-02
  10. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (1) 2023-03-27
  11. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2020-03-09

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Ran I. Shorrer should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.