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Harry Di Pei

Personal Details

First Name:Harry
Middle Name:Di
Last Name:Pei
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppe566
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://economics.mit.edu/grad/harrydp

Affiliation

Economics Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
http://econ-www.mit.edu/
RePEc:edi:edmitus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Shuo Liu & Harry Pei, 2017. "Monotone equilibria in signalling games," ECON - Working Papers 252, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

Articles

  1. Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Shuo Liu & Harry Pei, 2017. "Monotone equilibria in signalling games," ECON - Working Papers 252, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

    Cited by:

    1. Lukasz Balbus & Pawel Dziewulski & Kevin Reffett & Lukasz Wozny, 2020. "Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk," KAE Working Papers 2020-052, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
    2. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    3. Eliot Abrams & Jonathan Libgober & John List, 2020. "Research Registries: Facts, Myths, and Possible Improvements," Artefactual Field Experiments 00703, The Field Experiments Website.
    4. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2019. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 617-644, April.
    5. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2021.
    6. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    7. Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.

Articles

  1. Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.

    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Cotton & Arnaud Dellis, 2012. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," Working Papers 2013-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    2. Marco Catola, 2019. "Contribution and bribe: lobbying in presence of incumbent and bureaucrat," Discussion Papers 2019/247, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    3. Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1349-1374, April.
    4. Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel, 2019. "Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 651-672.
    5. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    6. Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    7. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    8. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    9. Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
    10. Alexander Frug, 2016. "Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission," Working Papers 937, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Foerster, Manuel & Habermacher, Daniel, 2023. "Policy-advising Competition and Endogenous Lobbies," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277613, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Cai, Zhifeng & Dong, Feng, 2023. "Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    13. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    14. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
    15. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    16. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2023. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    18. Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    19. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 199, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    20. Matteo Escud'e, 2023. "Covert learning and disclosure," Papers 2304.02989, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    21. Suzanne Bijkerk & Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Vladimir (V.A.) Karamychev & Otto (O.H.) Swank, 2018. "Need to Know? On Information Systems in Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    22. Mats Köster & Paul Voss, 2023. "Conversations," CESifo Working Paper Series 10275, CESifo.
    23. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    24. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_470, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    25. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2017-06-04. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2017-06-04. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2017-06-04. Author is listed

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