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Information about:
Filipe Campante

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works

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Other registered authors

Personal Details

First Name: Filipe
Middle Name:
Last Name: Campante
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pca428

Email:
Homepage: http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~fcampan/
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Location: Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
Homepage: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
Email:
Phone:
Fax: 617-496-2554
Postal: 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Handle: RePEc:edi:ksharus (registered authors at this institution)

Works

Working papers

Francisco H. G. Ferreira & Filipe Campante, 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Textos para discussÃ£o 483, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Published as:
- Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Filipe Robin Campante, 2001. "Distribuição de Riqueza, Grupos de Interesse e Desempenho Econômico," Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 29th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 062, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]

Articles

Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
- Francisco H. G. Ferreira & Filipe Campante, 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Textos para discussÃ£o 483, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
Filipe R. Campante & Anna R. V. Crespo & Phillippe G. P. G. Leite, 2004. "Desigualdade Salarial entre Raças no Mercado de Trabalho Urbano Brasileiro: Aspectos Regionais," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 58(2), April. [Downloadable!]

NEP Fields

2 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):

NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2004-02-23 Author is listed
NEP-LAM: Central & South America (1) 2004-02-23 Author is listed
NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2004-02-23 2004-08-16 Author is listed

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.

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