Filipe Campante
Personal Details
First Name: Filipe
Middle Name:
Last Name: Campante
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pca428
Email:
Homepage:
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~fcampan/
Postal Address:
Phone:
Affiliation
- Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University - Location: Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
Homepage: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
Email:
Phone:
Fax: 617-496-2554
Postal: 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Handle: RePEc:edi:ksharus (more details at EDIRC)
Works
Working papers
- Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2012.
"Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence,"
Working Paper Series
rwp12-058, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimarães, Bernardo, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9284, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo V. Guimaraes, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 19028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2012.
"Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States,"
Working Paper Series
rwp12-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States," NBER Working Papers 19027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2012. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States," Working Papers 21-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Chor, Davin, 2011.
""The People Want the Fall of the Regime": Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy,"
Working Paper Series
rwp11-018, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "The People Want the Fall of the Regime": Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy," Working Papers 08-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Chor, Davin & Campante, Filipe Robin, 2011. "'The People Want the Fall of the Regime': Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy," Scholarly Articles 4876868, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2011. "“The People Want the Fall of the Regime”:Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy," Working Papers 03-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Hojman, Daniel, 2010.
"Media and Polarization,"
Working Paper Series
rwp10-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Hojman, Daniel Andres, 2010. "Media and Polarization," Scholarly Articles 4454154, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2009.
"A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities,"
Working Papers
02-2009, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2009. "A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities," Working Paper Series rwp09-005, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2009. "A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration : Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities," Development Economics Working Papers 22059, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2009. "A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities," Scholarly Articles 4481653, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Chor, Davin & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2009.
"Instability and the Incentives for Corruption,"
Scholarly Articles
4778510, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc-Anh Do, 2009. "Instability And The Incentives For Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 42-92, 03.
- Filipe Campante & Edward L. Glaeser, 2009. "Yet Another Tale of Two Cities: Buenos Aires and Chicago," NBER Working Papers 15104, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Filipe R. Campante, 2009. "Keeping Dictators Honest: the Role of Population Concentration," Working Papers 01-2009, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Davin Chor & Do Quoc-Anh & Filipe R Campante, 2008. "Instability and Incentives for Corruption," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22070, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Davin Chor & Filipe R. Campante, 2008.
"Schooling and Political Participation Revisited,"
Working Papers
05-2008, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, revised Sep 2008.
- Davin Chor & Filipe R. Campante, 2008. "Schooling and Political Participation Revisited," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22072, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Chor, Davin, 2008. "Schooling and Political Participation in a Neoclassical Framework: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series rwp08-043, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe, 2007.
"Redistribution in a Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions,"
Working Paper Series
rwp07-045, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Campante, Filipe R., 2011. "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 646-656.
- Campante, Filipe R., 2011. "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 646-656, August.
- Campante, Filipe & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2007. "Inequality, Redistribution, and Population," Working Paper Series rwp07-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Francisco H. G. Ferreira & Filipe Campante, 2004.
"Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy,"
Textos para discussão
483, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
- Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June.
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank.
- Filipe Robin Campante, 2001. "Distribuição de Riqueza, Grupos de Interesse e Desempenho Econômico," Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 29th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 062, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
Articles
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 167-88, Spring.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor, 2012. "Schooling, Political Participation, and the Economy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 841-859, November.
- Campante, Filipe R., 2011.
"Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 646-656, August.
- Campante, Filipe R., 2011. "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 646-656.
- Campante, Filipe, 2007. "Redistribution in a Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions," Working Paper Series rwp07-045, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc-Anh Do, 2009.
"Instability And The Incentives For Corruption,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 42-92, 03.
- Campante, Filipe Robin & Chor, Davin & Do, Quoc-Anh, 2009. "Instability and the Incentives for Corruption," Scholarly Articles 4778510, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Alberto Alesina & Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, 2008.
"Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1006-1036, 09.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2090, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Working Papers 297, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1556, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," NBER Working Papers 11600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000465, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Campante, Filipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco H.G., 2007.
"Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 993-1021, June.
- Francisco H. G. Ferreira & Filipe Campante, 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Textos para discussão 483, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
- Campante, Felipe R. & Ferreira, Francisco G.H., 2004. "Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3240, The World Bank.
- Filipe R. Campante & Anna R. V. Crespo & Phillippe G. P. G. Leite, 2004. "Desigualdade Salarial entre Raças no Mercado de Trabalho Urbano Brasileiro: Aspectos Regionais," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 58(2), pages 185-210, April.
NEP Fields
13 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):- NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2004-02-23 2010-02-27
- NEP-CUL: Cultural Economics (1) 2010-02-27
- NEP-CWA: Central & Western Asia (1) 2011-09-05
- NEP-EDU: Education (1) 2009-02-07
- NEP-GEO: Economic Geography (4) 2009-07-03 2009-09-26 2012-05-29 2013-01-19. Author is listed
- NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (1) 2009-07-03
- NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (2) 2009-02-07 2009-07-03
- NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (5) 2009-02-07 2011-04-02 2011-09-05 2012-04-10 2012-05-29. Author is listed
- NEP-LAM: Central & South America (1) 2004-02-23
- NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2012-05-29 2012-06-13
- NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (11) 2004-02-23 2004-08-16 2009-02-07 2010-02-27 2011-04-02 2011-09-05 2012-04-10 2012-05-29 2012-05-29 2012-06-13 2013-01-19. Author is listed
- NEP-SEA: South East Asia (4) 2009-02-07 2009-09-26 2012-04-10 2012-06-13. Author is listed
- NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (5) 2009-07-03 2009-09-26 2012-05-29 2012-06-13 2013-01-19. Author is listed
Statistics
Most cited item
- Alberto Alesina & Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, 2008. "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1006-1036, 09.
Most downloaded item (past 12 months)
- Alberto Alesina & Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, 2008. "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1006-1036, 09.
Access and download statistics for all items
Co-authorship network on CollEc
Corrections
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