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Citations of
Venkatraman Sadanand

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

    Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

  1. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Damme, E. van & Hurkens, S., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Discussion Paper 115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Enrico Pennings, . "Optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible," Working Papers 206, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Attila Tasnádi, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2009_25, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Eilon Solan & Leeat Yariv, 1998. "Games with Espionage," Discussion Papers 1257, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    6. W. Güth, . "Robust Learning Experiments -Evidence for Learning and Deliberation-," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-82, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    7. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Marc Escrihuela Villar & Ramon Fauli Oller, . "Mergers in Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets," School of Economics Working Papers EC200701, Universidad de Guanajuato. [Downloadable!]
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    9. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2004. "Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenous: "More harm than good?"," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1400904, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
    10. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    11. Pacheco de Almeida, Goncalo & Zemsky, Peter, 2002. "Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 3674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    12. Gueth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E. van, 2002. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    13. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2002. "Time-To-Build Investment and Uncertainty in Oligopoly," Working Papers 200207, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
    14. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2001. "Fighting over Uncertain Demand: Investment Commitment versus Flexibility," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1060201, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
    15. Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    16. Gueth, Sandra & Gueth, Werner, 2000. "Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination - A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bossert, Walter & Nosal, Ed & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 173-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. BOSSERT, Walter & DERKS, Jean & PETERS, Hans, 2001. "Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games," Cahiers de recherche 2001-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Amparo M. Mármol Conde & Clara Ponsatí Obiols, 2006. "Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]

  3. Amershi Amin H. & Sadanand Asha & Sadanand Venkatraman, 1992. "Player importance and forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 291-297, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]

  4. Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand & Denton Marks, 1989. "Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 643-61, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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    2. Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Fredrik Andersson, 2001. "Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 173-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  5. Sadanand, V., 1988. "Endogenously determined price-setting monopoly in an exchange economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 172-178, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

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This page was last updated on 2010-1-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.