This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Citations of
Asha Sadanand

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Ii: Some Properties," Working Papers 1989-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - I: Forward Induction And Thought Process Dynamics In Extensive Form," Working Papers 1989-4, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. David Masclet & Marc Willinger & Charles Figuières, 2007. "The economics of the telethon: leadership, reciprocity and moral motivation," Working Papers 07-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
    3. David Masclet & Marc Willinger, 2006. "Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 06-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  3. Amershi, A.H. & Sadanand, A.B. & Sadanand, V., 1989. "Manipulated Nash Equilibria - Iii: Applications And A Preliminary Experiment," Working Papers 1989-6, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Articles

  1. Mattias K. Polborn & Michael Hoy & Asha Sadanand, 2006. "Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 327-354, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba & Casey Rothschild, 2006. "Redistribution by Insurance Market Regulation: Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities," NBER Working Papers 12205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Wenan Fei & Claude Fluet & Harris Schlesinger, 2008. "Uncertain Bequest Needs and Long-Term Insurance Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Iris Kesternich & Heiner Schumacher, 2009. "On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets," Discussion Papers 280, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    4. Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2008. "“No Solution to This Dilemma Exists”: Discrimination, Insurance, and the Human Genome Project," Working Papers 0808, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  2. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 153-183, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Jordi Brandts & Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2003. "Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 586.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. David Masclet & Marc Willinger & Charles Figuières, 2007. "The economics of the telethon: leadership, reciprocity and moral motivation," Working Papers 07-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
    5. David Masclet & Marc Willinger, 2006. "Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 06-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]

  3. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Damme, E. van & Hurkens, S., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Discussion Paper 115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Enrico Pennings, . "Optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible," Working Papers 206, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Attila Tasnádi, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2009_25, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Eilon Solan & Leeat Yariv, 1998. "Games with Espionage," Discussion Papers 1257, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    6. W. Güth, . "Robust Learning Experiments -Evidence for Learning and Deliberation-," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-82, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    7. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Marc Escrihuela Villar & Ramon Fauli Oller, . "Mergers in Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets," School of Economics Working Papers EC200701, Universidad de Guanajuato. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2004. "Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenous: "More harm than good?"," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1400904, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
    10. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    11. Pacheco de Almeida, Goncalo & Zemsky, Peter, 2002. "Time-to-Build and Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 3674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    12. Gueth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E. van, 2002. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    13. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2002. "Time-To-Build Investment and Uncertainty in Oligopoly," Working Papers 200207, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
    14. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2001. "Fighting over Uncertain Demand: Investment Commitment versus Flexibility," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1060201, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
    15. Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    16. Gueth, Sandra & Gueth, Werner, 2000. "Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination - A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  4. Amershi Amin H. & Sadanand Asha & Sadanand Venkatraman, 1992. "Player importance and forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 291-297, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]

  5. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Working Papers 1079, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Gregory K. Dow & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2005. "Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms," Microeconomics 0509003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Hervé Crès, 2006. "A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 377-406, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    4. Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erkan, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. CRES, Hervé & TVEDE, Mich, 2004. "The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability," Les Cahiers de Recherche 794, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    7. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]

  6. Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand & Denton Marks, 1989. "Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 643-61, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Fredrik Andersson, 2001. "Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 173-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? About 2700 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.