Citations of
In-Uck Park

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

1. Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Steven A. Matthews, 2006. "Smooth Monotone Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   2. Steven A. Matthews, 2008. "Achievable Outcomes in Smooth Dynamic Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   3. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   4. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

2. In-Uck Park, 2003. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/085, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2006. "Dynamic Network Formation," Working Papers 233, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
   2. Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   3. In-Uck Park, 2004. "Dynamic Formation of Network with Adoption Externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 662, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

3. Choe, Chongwoo & Park, In-Uck, 2003. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-23, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Choe, Chongwoo, 2002. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   • In-Uck Park & Chongwoo Choe, 2004. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 14, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Hanazaki, Masaharu & Horiuchi, Akiyoshi, 2003. "Have Banks Contributed to Efficient Management in Japan's Manufacturing?," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-22, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   2. Ahn, Sanghoon, 2003. "Technology Upgrading with Learning Cost," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-21, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   3. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Miguel Sanchez, 2005. "Hierarchic contracting," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 73, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   4. Dallago, Bruno, 2003. "Comparative Economic Systems and the New Comparative Economics: Foes, Competitors, or Complementary?," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-24, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   5. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   6. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

4. McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers 300, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
   Published as:
   • McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 111-130, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Philip V. Fellman & Jonathan Vos Post, 2007. "Quantum Nash Equilibria and Quantum Computing," Quantitative Finance Papers 0707.0324, arXiv.org. [Downloadable!]

5. Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
   Published as:
   • Park, In-Uck, 1997. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 431-448, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. In-Uck Park, 2000. "Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Differentiated Experts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1680, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

1. In-Uck Park, 2004. "Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 701-746, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2004. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Piero Gottardi & Alberto Bisin & Adriano Rampini, 2007. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Working Papers 2007_24, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   2. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Code for "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation"," Computer Codes 06-26, Review of Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]

2. In-Uck Park, 2002. "Cheap-Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 377-393, Autumn.

   Cited by:

3. McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 111-130, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers 300, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.

   See citations under working paper version above.

4. Park, In-Uck, 1997. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 431-448, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.

   See citations under working paper version above.

5. Green, Edward J. & Park, In-Uck, 1996. "Bayes contingent plans," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 225-236, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät. [Downloadable!]
   2. Edward J. Green, 1995. "Reconciling Some Conflicting Evidence on Decision Making under Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 9509002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   3. Edward J. Green & In-Uck Park, 1995. "Three contributions to the theory of decision under uncertainty," Working Papers 558, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.