Citations of
Thomas Marschak

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Articles | Chapters | Access and download statistics

Articles

1. Thomas Marschak, 2004. "Information Technology and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 473-515, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Li, Yanfei & Yao, Shuntian & Chia, Wai-Mun, 2009. "Endogenous Firm and Information Rent Under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13506, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
   2. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2006. "Shirking and Squandering in Sharing Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]

2. Marschak, Thomas & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1998. "Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 106-141, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   3. Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Finance 0311003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

3. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   2. Guoqiang Tian, 2006. "The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 155-182, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

4. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Timothy Van Zandt & Roy Radner, 1998. "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale," Discussion Papers 1233, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

5. Marschak, T A & Selten, Reinhard, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Subir K Chakrabarti, 1987. "Strong, Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of Inertia Supergames," Discussion Papers 716, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   2. Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter, 1992. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Working Papers 92-52, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
   3. Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald, 1980. "Nonmyoptic Equilibria," Working Papers 80-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
   4. Joel Guttman & Michael Miller, 1979. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 150, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   5. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 335-55.
   6. Jim Andreoni, . "Do Government Subsidies Affect the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Papers _033, University of Michigan, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   7. Brams, Steven J., 1992. "Cycles of Conflict," Working Papers 92-51, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

6. Thomas Marschak, 1959. "Capital Budgeting and Pricing in the French Nationalized Industries," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33, pages 133. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. David, Laurent & Le Breton, Michel & Merillon, Olivier, 2007. "Kolm as a Contributor to Public Utility Pricing, Second Best Culture and the Theory of Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 490, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]

1. Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-12-20.