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Citations of
Anthony M Marino

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Anthony Marino & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 1107, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Joon Song, 2008. "Perks: Contractual Arrangements to Restrain Moral Hazard," Economics Discussion Papers 650, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  2. Anthony Marino & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "A Rent Extraction View of Employee Discounts and Benefits," Working Papers 1108, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "The Currency of Reciprocity - Gift-Exchange in the Workplace," IEW - Working Papers iewwp377, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    2. Michael D. Grubb & Paul Oyer, 2008. "Who Benefits from Tax-Advantaged Employee Benefits?: Evidence from University Parking," NBER Working Papers 14062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Articles

  1. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work-related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "A Rent Extraction View of Employee Discounts and Benefits," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 485-518, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Anthony M. Marino, 2007. "Delegation versus Veto in Organizational Games of Strategic Communication," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 979-992, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2004. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Papers 129, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]

  4. ANTHONY M. MARINO & JÁN ZÁBOJNÍK, 2006. "Merger, Ease Of Entry And Entry Deterrence In A Dynamic Model," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 397-423, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Robin Mason & Helen Weeds, 2007. "Merger Policy, Entry, and Entrepreneurship," Economics Discussion Papers 634, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2007. "Downstream Mergers And Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    3. Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper 2008-005, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Marino, Anthony M., 2006. "Delegation versus an approval process and the demand for talent," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 487-503, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Disobedience and Authority," Working Papers 1109, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  6. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 301-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," IEPR Working Papers 05.9, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
    2. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000068, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Anthony Marino & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 1107, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Relational Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Relational Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers 1454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    7. Anke Kessler, 2005. "Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 9-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    8. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    9. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Disobedience and Authority," Working Papers 1109, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    10. John Matsusaka, 2005. "The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 157-177, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    11. Lars Feld, 2005. "The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    12. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200423, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  7. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2004. "Internal Competition for Corporate Resources and Incentives in Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 710-727, Winter.

    Cited by:

    1. Fumi Kiyotaki, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments with Multiple Tasks," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0804, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]

  8. Marino, Anthony M, 1998. "Regulation of Performance Standards versus Equipment Specification with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 5-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Marette, Stèphan, 2005. "Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, The," Staff General Research Papers 12486, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Cho, Bo-Hyun & Hooker, Neal H., 2006. "Selection of Food Safety Standards," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21077, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]

  9. Marino, Anthony M, 1997. "A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 245-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Thomsen, Michael R. & Ollinger, Michael & Crandall, Philip G. & O'Bryan, Corliss, 2008. "Mandatory Food Recalls," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6083, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]

  10. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Regulation of Product Safety Design through Product Testing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 255-76, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Marette, Stéphan, 2007. "Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition (The)," Staff General Research Papers 12718, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  11. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Are Safety and Environmental Performance Standards Optimal Regulatory Instruments?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-79, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Marette, Stéphan, 2007. "Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition (The)," Staff General Research Papers 12718, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  12. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-95, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Marette, Stéphan, 2007. "Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition (The)," Staff General Research Papers 12718, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  13. Campbell, Tim S & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 855-75, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Ingmar Nyman, 2004. "Stock Market Speculation and Managerial Myopia," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 402, Hunter College: Department of Economics, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Jörn Hendrich Block, 2008. "Family Management, Family Ownership and Downsizing: Evidence from S&P 500 Firms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-023, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  14. Tim S. Campbell & Yuk-Shee Chan & Anthony M. Marino, 1990. "An incentive based theory of bank regulation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143. [Downloadable!]
    2. Xavier Freixas & Emmanuelle Gabillon, 1996. "Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System," Economics Working Papers 175, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    3. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    5. João Cabral dos Santos, 1995. "Bank capital and equity investment regulations," Working Paper 9515, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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    6. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, 2005. "Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management," NBER Working Papers 11666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank," Finance 0411027, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    9. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "Deposit insurance, bank incentives, and the design of regulatory policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    10. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, . "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    11. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision : The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    12. Ben Craig, 1996. "Competing currencies: back to the future?," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Oct 15. [Downloadable!]

  15. Marino, Anthony M., 1988. "Products liability and scale effects in a long-run competitive equilibrium," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 97-107, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Hamilton, Stephen F., 1998. "Taxation, Fines, And Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency And Market Structure Implications," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20928, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
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    2. Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Anthony M. Marino & Joseph Sicilian, 1987. "Direct Investment in Conservation Measures by a Public Utility," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 137-146.

    Cited by:

    1. Franz Wirl & Wolfgang Orasch, 1998. "Analysis of United States' Utility Conservation Programs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 467-486, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-26.

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