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Citations of
Arnold Chassagnon

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," PSE Working Papers 2006-51, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2009. "Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," IDEI Working Papers 558, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  2. Chassagnon, A. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition," Papers 28, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.

    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Wendy Edelberg, 2004. "Testing for adverse selection and moral hazard in consumer loan markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    3. T. Santos & J. Scheinkman, 2000. "Competition Among Exchanges," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s12, Economics Department, Princeton University.
      Other versions:
    4. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Agar Brugiavini & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market," Working Papers 2006_39, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2006. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 614, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Arnold Chassagnon & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2005. "Optimal risk-sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 955-978, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.